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Weak supervision (WS) frameworks are a popular way to bypass hand-labeling large datasets for training data-hungry models. These approaches synthesize multiple noisy but cheaply-acquired estimates of labels into a set of high-quality pseudo-labels for downstream training. However, the synthesis technique is specific to a particular kind of label, such as binary labels or sequences, and each new label type requires manually designing a new synthesis algorithm. Instead, we propose a universal technique that enables weak supervision over any label type while still offering desirable properties, including practical flexibility, computational efficiency, and theoretical guarantees. We apply this technique to important problems previously not tackled by WS frameworks including learning to rank, regression, and learning in hyperbolic space. Theoretically, our synthesis approach produces a consistent estimators for learning some challenging but important generalizations of the exponential family model. Experimentally, we validate our framework and show improvement over baselines in diverse settings including real-world learning-to-rank and regression problems along with learning on hyperbolic manifolds. 

Due to its decentralized nature, Federated Learning (FL) lends itself to adversarial attacks in the form of backdoors during training. The goal of a backdoor is to corrupt the performance of the trained model on specific sub-tasks (e.g., by classifying green cars as frogs). A range of FL backdoor attacks have been introduced in the literature, but also methods to defend against them, and it is currently an open question whether FL systems can be tailored to be robust against backdoors. In this work, we provide evidence to the contrary. We first establish that, in the general case, robustness to backdoors implies model robustness to adversarial examples, a major open problem in itself. Furthermore, detecting the presence of a backdoor in a FL model is unlikely assuming first order oracles or polynomial time. We couple our theoretical results with a new family of backdoor attacks, which we refer to as edge-case backdoors. An edge-case backdoor forces a model to misclassify on seemingly easy inputs that are however unlikely to be part of the training, or test data, i.e., they live on the tail of the input distribution. We explain how these edge-case backdoors can lead to unsavory failures and may have serious repercussions on fairness, and exhibit that with careful tuning at the side of the adversary, one can insert them across a range of machine learning tasks (e.g., image classification, OCR, text prediction, sentiment analysis).